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APPEAL

AND

ERaoR-EFFEcT

OF APPEAL

ON

JUDGMENT

BELow-WHEN

TRIAL is de Novo-The mere appeal from a decree vacating probate of a will

does not have the effect of vacating the decree merely because the trial in the
Supreme Court is de novo, and the dismissal of the appeal, though wrongful,
does not vacate the decree appealed from. Stewart et al. v. O'Neal, 237 Fed.
Rep. 897 (Ohio 1917).
While this point is almost always regulated by statute, the courts seem to
have divided into two groups. On the one hand it is held that the judgment
of the lower court is not annulled by an appeal; it is at most merely suspended
and is binding upon the parties as to every question directly decided. Black
v. Black, III N. Car. 3oo (1887) ; Dinwiddie v. Shipman, 183 Ind. 86 (i915).
Under this view, the appeal does not preclude the parties from suing on the
judgment, or from prosecuting collateral or independent proceedings. The
principal case follows this view. On the other hand, other jurisdictions take
the view that when an appeal is taken, the judgment appealed from is vacated
and annulled, and the litigants are, with respect to their legal rights, just
where they were at the commencement of the suit. Butler v. U. S. Savings &
Loan Co., 97 Tenn. 679 (i896); Klicka v. Klicka, 105 Ill. App. 369 (I9o3);
Schenck v. Boston Elevated Rly. Co., 2o7 Mass. 437 (i91). The courts adhering to this view take the position that the judgment appealed from cannot be
the foundation of a new action.
BANKRUPrCY-DEBTS NOT RELEASED BY DIScHARGE-LIABILITIES FOR OBTAINING PROPERTY BY FALSE PRETENSES-A bankrupt had made false repre-

sentations as to his financial condition in obtaining a bond from a surety
company. The bankrupt defaulted and the surety company paid. Held: A
judgment in favor of the surety company was not released by his discharge.
In re Dunfee, 114 N. E. (.N. Y.) 52.
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides: "A discharge in bankruptcy
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as . . .
(2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations."
The court held that obtaining the bond by the false representations and
paying the obligee must be regarded as all one transaction. This was equivalent to payment by the surety company to the bankrupt and by him to .he
obligee. The bankrupt therefore obtained property by false pretenses. Money
has been held to be property within the meaning of this section. Hallagan v.
Dowell, I39 N. W. 883 (Ia. 1913).
The only similar case to be found arising under section 17 is in accord.
Gaddy v. Witt, 142 S. W. 926 (Tex. 1911).
But the same circumstances were held not to bar a discharge under section
14 of the Bankruptcy Act.

In re Tanner, 192 Fed. 572 (1911).

This case

may be distinguished from the principal case on two grounds. Section 14 as
relevant to this case, i. e., before the amendment of I9io, provided: "The
judge shall . . . discharge the applicant unless he has . . . (3) obtained

property on credit from any person upon a materially false statement in
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writing made to such person for the purpose of obtaining such property on
credit." In the first place, the court considered whether the bond itself and
not the money finally paid out, was "property" within the meaning of the act,
and held that it was not. It was aided in arriving at this decision by the fact
that in the amendment of igio "money or" was inserted before "property,"
which would indicate that it was doubtful if even money was "property"
within the meaning of the section before the amendment, much less mere
contingent liability to pay money, as this bond. Because of its effect in preventing any discharge, it is natural that the word "property" in section 14
should be more strictly construed than the same word in section 17, which
merely excepts individual liabilities from the effects of a discharge.
Secondly, the court was of the opinion that even though the bond was
property it was not obtained "on credit," because the relation of debtor and
creditor did not exist after the delivery of the bond any more than before.
There is no provision that the property must be obtained on credit in section 17.
CARRIERS-STREET RAILWAY COMPANIEs-PERsoN BOARDING CAR-An intending passenger boarded the rear platform of a moving trolley, which
collided with a train as he was proceeding to enter the car. The court held
it a question for the jury whether the contractual relation of carrier and
passenger existed at the time of the accident. Berkebile v. Johnstown Trac-

tion Company,

255

Pa. 310 (1917).

The essentials necessary to the relationship of passenger and carrier are
an undertaking by a person to travel in the carrier's conveyance, and an
acceptance by the carrier.- Berry v. Mo. Pacific Ry. Co., i24 Mo. 223 (1899).
Whether these elements existed is a question of fact for the jury, and it
seems clear that though a prospective passenger boarded the car negligently,
this does not bar his becoming a passenger if subsequently accepted as such.
Geiger v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 237 Pa. 287 (1915).

Though a rule forbid-

ding entrance or exit while the car is in motion be displayed, if it appears the
rule was waived, the relationship is as sufficiently established as if the entrance
had been proper. The North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Williams, 14o Ill.
275 (1892).

As to injuries received in boarding or alighting from a moving car, the
dominant rule is that it is not negligence per se to attempt to board or alight
from a moving car. O'Mara v. St. Louis Traction Co., Io Mo. App. 202
(19o3) ; Birmingham Railway Light & Power Co. v. Girod, 164 Ala. io (I9o).
Though so attempting is not negligence per se in most instances, it may be so
when, under the attendant circumstances, the attempt was so obviously dangerous that a man of ordinary prudence would not try it. Fosnes v. Duluth
Street Railway Co., 140 Wis. 455 (9o9).
The jury should consider the speed of the car, whether the person was
encumbered with bundles, etc. Watkins v. Birmingham Ry., i2o Ala. 147
(897).
In Hunterson v. Union Traction Co., 205 Pa. 568 (19o3), a divided court
declared the Pennsylvania rule to be, contra to the usual rule, that it is negligence per se, except in rare cases, to alight from or board a moving car.
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Such a rare exception occurred in Powelson v. United Traction Co., 216 Pa.
583 (i9o7), and the question was there held to be for the jury.
In Berkebile v. Johnstown Traction Co., supra, the court, since the evidence was such that it could not be declared as a matter of law that the
plaintiff had not become a passenger, a judgment of nonsuit was reversed with
a procedendo, the jury to determine, in accord with the general rule, the status
of plaintiff at the time of the accident.
CONTEMPT-NEwSPAPER

-

PUBLICATION-PRESENCE OF COURT-OBSTRUCTION

oF JusTicE-Section 125, Revised Statutes, limits the power of federal courts
to punish for contempt, to misbehavior in their presence or so near thereto as
to obstruct the administration of justice. A newspaper company published
articles tending to provoke resistance to an injunctional order should one be
granted in a pending suit. Held: The publication was a contempt punishable
under the statute. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United.States, 237 Fed. 986.
At common law any publication concerning a pending cause, calculated
to prevent a fair and impartial trial or seeking to influence judicial action by
any form of intimidation, or tending to corrupt or embarrass the administration of justice, constituted contempt. State v. Bee Publishing Co., 6o Neb. 282
(Igoo) ; McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho I9I (1913). It was at first thought
that the Act of Congress referred to in the principal case deprived the courts
of jurisdiction to proceed for contempt against any newspaper publication, no
matter how scandalous. Ex parte Poulson, i9 Fed. Gas. I2O5 (No. 11350)
(1835). It was held that a newspaper editorial which only criticised the
official conduct and integrity of the court was not liable for contempt. In re
Daniels, 131 Fed. 95 (I9O4). But the attitude of the federal courts has
changed. The rule has recently been laid down that this statute applies to all
acts of misbehavior whose natural tendency and effect is to interfere with the
administration of justice, wherever committed. U. S. v. Huff, 2o6 Fed. 700
(1913). The decision in the principal case is a final vindication of the power
of the federal courts to protect themselves. The decision in the district court
(22o Fed. 458, 1915) is an admirable monograph on the law of contempt in
the federal courts.
In Pennsylvania, by the Act of June i6, 1836, P. L. 784, Par. 26, it is provided that no publication out of court shall be construed into a contempt. See
In this rule Pennsylvania stands pracIn re Greery, 4 W. N. C. 308 (877).
tically alone. For a r~sum6 of the law in other jurisdictions, see 6i U. PA. L.
REV. 516 and 64 U. PA. L Rxv. 97.
CONT.CTs-CoNsIDERTIoN-SuscainioN-Action on a promissory note
executed in payment of a subscription to a church building fund. Held: The
incurring of liabilities in reliance on a promise to subscribe is sufficient consideration to bind the promisor. Erdman v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 99
Atl. 793 (Md. 1917).
The case seems in accord with the weight of authority today, In re Converse's Estate, 24o Pa. 458 (913), and the cases collected in 62 U. PA. L.
REV. 222. It is said that this doctrine of enforcing voluntary subscriptions
cannot be upheld on any satisfactory theory of law, i5 Harv. L Rev. 312; 62
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U. PA. L. REV. 296, and this view is adopted by several jurisdictions in part
at least. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528 (i87); Presbyterian Church v.
Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517 (i889). These jurisdictions, however, seem today to
be tending toward the general rule, Robinson v. Nutt, I85 Mass. 345 (1904);
Locke v. Taylor, 16i App. Div. 44 (N. Y. I914), which based its decision on
the authority of Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96 (igoI). This case
approved of Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, supra, but raised an implied
request by the promisor that work be done or a liability incurred which Church
v. Cooper refused to do. Locke v. Taylor, supra, apparently misinterprets
Keuka College v. Ray and cites it as laying down the majority rule.
The theory, deemed most satisfactory by precedent, views the subscription as an offer of a unilateral contract accepted by performing the condition
or by incurring liability in reliance on the offer. Trustees v. Garvey, 53 Ill.
401 (x87o) ; Board of Trustees v. Noyes, 165 Iowa 6oi (1914). It is said that
this theory is based on a violent implication of a request by the promisor that
the work be done or the liability be incurred. That this implication is in
accord with the historical development of legal implications in contract is
most clearly shown in Professor Ames' profound article on the History of
Assumpsit, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, 259.
The entire doctrine today is in a most unsatisfactory condition, as many
courts still cling to generally discarded theories. Lasar v. Johnson, 125 Cal.
549 (i89g) ; Rousseau v. Call, i69 N. C. 173 (1gz5). The modem tendency is
basis, however unsatisfactory by itself. Brokaw v. McElroy, 162 Iowa 288
to practically base the doctrine on public policy with almost any reason for a
(1913).
CONTRACTS-ILLEGAL

STAxcHoLDER-Republican

AS

AGAINST

PLmLIC PoLicy-REcovERY

FRoM

A

and Democratic nominees for jailer agreed that the

Democrat should withdraw, and, when elected, the Republican would appoint
him deputy and divide the fees. The Republican deposited $5oo with a stakeholder to be given the Democrat if the agreement was not carried out. The
agreement was fulfilled, but the stakeholder refused to give back the money.
Held: It could not be recovered from him. Martin v. Francis, 191 S. W. 259
(Ky. I917).

An illegal contract can be rescinded and money recovered from a stakeholder if it has not been paid over, although the contingent event has happened. McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S. & R. 147 (Pa. 1821). But see Schenck
v. Hirschfield, 22 Cal. App. 709 (I9io). But not after it has been paid over.
Davis v. Fleshman & Co., 245 Pa. 224 (1914).

The stakeholder is liable if he

pays it over after demand. Ward v. Holliday, 87 Neb. 6o7 (IgIO) ; Cassidy v.
Manlick, 21 Pa. D. R. 575 (1g1o). As to this point, see 61 U. PA. L. REv. 268.
.Contracts against public policy, however, differ from mere gambling contracts. The law will have nothing to do with them. Pittsburgh v. Goshor,
230 Pa. 212 (I9I1); Matthews v. Lopus, 24 Cal. App. 63 (i9i1), where
recovery from a stakeholder was refused. Those tending to corrupt or interfere with the free exercise of the elective franchise are particularly pernicious
and void. Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R., 57 U. S. 314 (1853); Basket v. Moss,
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115 N. C. 448 (1894). And so in our principal case the court says, ". . . and
there is no reason why the wholesome principle should not be extended and
properly applied to this case."
CONTRACTs-SUNDAY-REscissIoN-A bill in equity was brought to rescind
a sale made on Sunday and to recover the purchase price. Held: An action
could not be maintained since the contract was illegal and void and imposed a
disability upon each of the parties. Bartram v. Morgan, i9i S. W. 317 (Ky.
1917).
This would have been a valid contract at common law. Foreman v. Ahl,
55 Pa. 325 (1867). The principal case follows the general rule that an action
arising out of a contract in contravention of a statute f6r the observation of
the Lord's Day cannot be maintained, either to enforce its performance or
compel its rescission. Myers v. Mainrath, ioi Mass. 366 (i869); Kelly v.
Cosgrove, 83 Ia. 229 (,i89i); Cohn v. Heinbach, 86 Wis. 176 (1893). The
principle of public policy involved is thus expressed: "Ex dolo malo non
oritur actio." Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439 (1871). It is the rule in a few
jurisdictions that such a contract may be rescinded by a party who first returns
the consideration received. Brayce v. Bryant, 5o Mich. 136 (1883) ; Maurer
v. Wolff, 21 N. Y. Supp. 2D2 (1893).
There is the same difference of authority in the case of executory Sunday
contracts. The weight of authority as stated in the principal case is that no
action can be maintained thereon either to recover the property or its value
or the agreed price. Black v. McMurry, 56 Miss. 217 (1878) ; Foreman v. Ahl,
supra; Troewert v. Decker, 5I Wis. 46 (i88i). There are decisions the other
way. Brown v. Timmany, 20 Ohio 8I (i85I). Money paid on an agreement
entered into on Sunday may be recovered back so long as the contract remains executory. Adams v. Gay, I9 Vt. 358 (i847). By statute in Maine and
Connecticut, a party cannot plead the invalidity of such a contract unless he
tenders back the consideration. Wentworth v. Woodside, 79 Me. i56 (1887);
Wetherell v. Hallister, 73 Conn. 622 (igoi). This exception to the rule as
stated by the principal case is statutory. Bank v. Kingsley, 84 Me. ii (i89i).

ExEcuToRs-ComPETENcy-The code provided that want of understanding
rendered a person incompetent to receive letters, or act as testamentary trustee. A testator of an estate of over $5,oooooo appointed as executor a retired
physician sixty-three years old who was partly paralyzed and whose mental
faculties were impaired. The surrogate held that only imbeciles and lunatics
were disqualified and that the nature and extent of the duties were not to be
considered in determining the question of competency. (96 Misc. 419.) The
Appellate Division reversed this on the ground that one who because of
mental infirmities was unfit to discharge the duties of the trust cpme within
the provision (x61 N. Y. S. 372). Held: This was the correct rule. The
words of the code do not imply an entire lack of understanding. In re
Leland's Will, 1i4 N. E. 854 (N. Y. i916).
The common-law rule is that all persons may be made executors who are
capable of making a will; idiots and lunatics are practically the only classes
disqualified. Berry v. Hamilton, 12 B. Monroe 191, 54 Am. Dec. 518 (Ky.
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1851); Kidd v. Bates, I2O Ala. 79 0897). The tendency, however, is to
enlarge the discretionary power of probate courts by statute so that persons
evidently unsuitable to act as executors shall not be qualified, or, if qualified,
be removed for cause duly shown. Schouler on Wills, 5th [i915] Ed., Sec.
1033.
Want of understanding as used in this statute is by no means a want of
understanding of the legal duties of an administrator. Goods of Shilton,
Tucker 73 (N. Y. 1865), where a petition for letters testamentary was
unsuccessfully contested by creditors. And the fact that the executor appointed was very bitter towards the testator and at times became so aroused
as to be thought temporarily insane did not make him incompetent, for that
did not show he lacked ordinary business prudence. McGregor v. McGregor,
i Keyes 133 (N. Y. 1864).
The Massachusetts statute provides that any executor who becomes incapable of discharging his trust or evidently unsuitable therefor shall be
removed. This incapability may arise from defect of memory, want of
physical ability, or other like infirmity, and the probate judge has broad discretion. Thayer v. Homer, 52 Mass. 1o4 (1846). Proof of mere weakness of
mind will not be sufficient cause for removing an executor. Evans v. Tyler,
2 Roberts 128 (Eng. 1849). In Estate of Shaw, L. R. [x9o5] P. 92, an executor
was removed because of facts similar to those of the principal case.
HIGHWAYS-NEGLIGENcE-OPERATION

OF MoToR CAR-A

motor car oper-

ated by A collided with a carriage being driven in the same direction by B.
A's lights had refused to work, but he had jroceeded after hanging a lantern
over. the hood. Held: Independently of any statute, it is negligence as a
matter of law to drive a motor car along the highway on a dark night at such
speed that it cannot be stopped within the distance that objects can be seen
ahead of it. Fisher v. O'Brien, 162 Pac. 317 (Kan. 1917).
The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority that it is negligence as a matter of law to operate a motor car with lights so dim that the
driver is unable to stop when he sees objects in the road. Lanson v. Fond du
Lac, 141 Wis. 57 (i9o9); Harman v. Height, I55 N. W. 563 (Mich. 1915).
The driver of a motor car must use that degree of care and caution which
an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, i65 Ind. 465 (19o5) ; Christy v.
Elliott, 216 Ill. 31 (19o5) ; Needy v. Littlejohn, r37 Iowa 7o4 (igo8). In cases
which are not so clear-cut as the principal one, the courts hold that the question of negligence is for the jury. Gifford v. Jennings, i9o Mass. 54 (xgo6).
A prima fade case of negligence was held made out where it was shown that
a motor car was operated after night without headlights in McFern v. Gardner, 121 Mo. App. I (igo6). The owners of motor cars are subjedt to reasonable and proper regulations and travellers by motor car have equal rights and
liability with those by other vehicles. Hennessy v. Taylor, 189 Mass. 583
(1905) ; Wright v. Crane, i42 Mich. 5o8 (i9o5). The Pennsylvania rules and
regulations will be found in Curran v. Lorch, -47 Pa. 429 (i915), and Act of
April 27, 19o9, P. L. 265.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-PoLIcEMAN AS
EMPLOYEE-A police officer, while attempting to make an arrest, was shot and
killed. Held: A police officer is not an employee and his dependents are not
entitled to compensation. Griswold v. Wichita, x62 Phc. 276 (Kan. 1917).
Whether police officers are included in the term "employee" as used in
compensation acts depends largely on the wording of the act. Such persons
are expressly excluded from the benefits of the English act, and are not entitled to compensation if injured while performing their duty. Sudell v. Blackburn Corp., 3 B. W. C. C. 227 (Eng. i9io). On the other hand, they are expressly included in acts of other jurisdictions. West Salem v. Ind. Comm.,
x55 N. W. 929 (Wis. i9x6).
Where the act provides for compensation for all persons in the service
of a city, except officials, it has been held that a police officer is an official and
not entitled to compensation. Blynn v. City of Pontiac, 151 N. W. 68r (Mich.
xqi5). The principal case was decided partly on the same theory, and partly
on the theory that a city is not in the business of employing police officers for
gain or profit. It has been held in some cases however, under acts similar in
phraseology, that a police officer is an employee whether he is an official or
not. State ex rel. v. District Court, I58 N. W. 19r (Minn. 1916).
By the terms of the Pennsylvania act, "employer" includes municipal corporations and an employee is one who performs services for another for a
valuable consideration. Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736. Under this act, the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Board has held that a police officer
is an employee. Smith v. City of Reading, 2 Dep. Rep. 1644 (Pa. I916).
However, an elective public officer, e. g., a constable, is not an employee.
Shipe v. County of Blair, 2 Dep. Rep. 2290 (Pa. igi6); Sibley v. State, 96
Adl. x61 (Conn. I9i5).
It has been held that a town marshal is a police officer and an employee.
Village of Kiel v. Ind. Comm., i58 N. W. 68 (Wis. 1916). And where the
act provides for compensation for police officers, it has been held that a private citizen injured while assisting a police officer is entitled to compensation
as though he had been an officer. West Salem v. Ind. Comm., supra.
PARENT AND C LD--DAUGHTER'S DRESSMAKER Bi. s-A wife, unauthorized, pledged her husband's credit for unnecessary gowns for their infant
daughter. The husband received the bills, but did not repudiate the transaction until two months after his knowledge thereof. Held: As the dressmaker could rightfully, and did, assume the debt was contracted by the husband's authority, he is liable. Ausinger v. Cochrane, 114 N. E. (Mass.) 355.
To charge a father for non-necessaries bought by or for an infant there
must be express authority, or the father must have allowed the purchase, in
some way leading the vendor to believe the goods were bought by authority
or with his consent. The mere relationship does not establish an authority.
Cousins v. Boyer, 114 N. Y. App. Div. 787 (I9o6); Freeman v. Robinson, 38
N. J. L 383 (1876).
In recent cases parallel to the principal case, the defendant has generally
done some positive act indicating assent. In Armstrong Clothing Co. v.
Boggs, go Neb. 499 (1912), a partial payment was made by the father, and
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likewise in Ventress v. Gunn, 6 Ala. App. Ct. Rep. 226 (I912). In Nagler v.
L'Esperance, 126 N. Y. S. 655 (IgiI), the defendant visited the store and
expressed approval of goods charged. But Snell v. Haun, 151 S. W. 1077
(Tex. 1912), indicates, in accord with Ausinger v. Cochrane, supra, that
whether the goods be bought by the infant, or by the wife for the infant, that
the father upon learning of the vendor's assumption of an authorized agency
must take positive steps to repqdiate the assumed agency within a reasonqb.fe
time after his knowledge thereof, pr he will be deemed to have acquiesced in
the transaction.
The degree of maintenance which it is a father's duty to provide is variable, dependent uporl his and his children's situation and condition in life.
De Brauere v. De Brauere, 2o3 N. Y. 4 o (1911). It is the tradesman's duty
to show the goods sold the minor were necessaries, viz., such as are usually
supplied children in like circumstances. Gately v. Vinson, 182 S. W. 133 (Mo.
1916).
PROPEmRY-DEED-DELIVEmY IN Escaow-Where a deed for land was delivered to a third person to be by him delivered to the grantee on performance
of a condition, in pursuance of a parol contract of sale, the contract being
invalid, the heir of the grantor can recall the deed, Main v. Pratt, 1i4 N. E.
(I1.) 576.
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that there must be a
valid contract pf sale for ail istrument to operate as an escrow and that in
the absence of such a contract the party making the instrument may recall it.
Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437 (1877) ; Davis v. Brigham, io7 Pac. 96i
(Ore. i9io). The principal case also follows the majority rule that the undelivered deed is not, by itself, a sufficient writing to satisfy the Statute of
Fratds. Campbpll v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437 (1877); Kopp v. Reiter, 146 Ill.
437 (i893).
Other anthorities hold that the undelivered deed will satisfy the StP.tute
of Frauds if it contains the substance of the parol contract. Parrill v. McKinley, 9 Gratt, i (Va. 1853); Magee v. Blsnhenship, 95 N. C. 563 (1886);
Moore v. Ward, 7i W. Va. 393 (1912).
The doctrine of the principal case does not apply to the delivery of a deed
to Athird person to be delivered to the grantee on the happening of a future
certAin event, where title passes on the first delivery and no valid contract is
reqtuired. Campbell v. Thomas, sup ra.
PRoPERTY-FixTURES-BUMIDsNGs-In

a suit to determine the ownership

of houses placed on a lot by a tenant. Held: The question is a mixed one of
law and fact depending on the character of annexation and intention of the
parties. If removable houses, erected by a tenant, are not removed at quitting
of premises they cannot later be claimed in the absence of a special agreement
with the landowner. Noyes v. Gagnan, 114 N. E. 949 (Mass. I917).
The classic tests for determining whether a chattel has become affixed
are the character of the annexation, the adaptability to the uses of the realty,
and the intention of the party affixing. Fuller-Warren Co. v. Harter, iIo.
Wis. 8o (igoI). The most important test is the intention of affixer as derived
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from all the circumstances rather than the actual intention, Wood v. Holly
Co., ioo Ala. 326 (1893) ; but if it is impossible to remove the chattel without
material damage to the realty, this fact is practically conclusive. Farrar v.
Stackpole, 6 Greenl. x54 (Me. 1829).
The question is a mixed one of law and fact, Hayford v. Wentworth, 97
Me. 347 (1903), though apparently if all the facts are admitted it is merely a
question of law as to intention. Radiator Mfg. Co. v. Hendricks, 72 Mo. App.
315 (1897). Originally a building was prima facie a fixture, Ry. Co. v. First
Nat. Bank, 134 Ind. 127 (1893), but now the burden of showing the existence
of the requisites necessary to effect a transference of a chattel into realty is
upon the claimant. Hayford v. Wentworth, 97 Me. 347 (i9o3). Under this
rule a landowner cannot acquire a chattel by affixing to his realty. Chapin v.
Freeland, 142 Mass. 383 (1886). Where a chattel is affixed through a mistake
as to boundary, it becomes a fixture. Dutton v. Ensley, 21 Ind. App. 46
(i88).
While an affixed chattel may be removable as between a conditional
vendor or tenant and the landowner, it generally is a fixture in favor of a
mortgagee or purchaser unless the title to realty is acquired with knowledge
of the right to remove. Lynn v. Waldron, 38 Wash. 82 (i9o5);
It is generally held that a dispossessed tenant has a reasonable time to
remove fixtures, Bergh v. Safe Co., 69 C. C. A. 212 (1905) ; though when a
lease gives tenant right to remove buildings erected by him and he breaks
the lease by a default in rent, it has been held that he loses his right. Van
Vleck v. White, 72 N. Y. S. io26 (goi).
PROPERTY-MERGER oF LIFE EsTATE-LABILrry OF REMAINDERMAN FOR
REPAias-A remainderman purchased the dower interest of a widow, and the
interest in remainder of four of the other five remaindermen; he then improved the property during the widow's life. Held: There was no merger
of the undivided one-sixth, and during the widow's life the purchaser held
this as a life tenant; consequently, the remainderman who did not join in the
conveyance is not liable for the repairs made. Larmon v. Larmon, 191 S. W.
o10
(Ky. I917).
It is fundamental that equity will not allow a merger contrary to the
intention of the parties, or where the rights of third parties require that there
be no merger. Moore v. Luce, 29 Pa. 26o (1857). Therefore, if two tenants
hold the life estate, and one purchases the interests in remainder, there is not
a merger so long as the other life estate is ottstanding. Johnson v. Johnson,
7 Allen 196 (Mass. '863). And if one of several cotenants in remainder purchases the life estate, there is no merger which inures to the benefit of all the
cotenants. Accordingly, in partition proceedings, the purchaser of the life
estate can recover the value of the interest he purchased. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 8o Md. 115 (i894).
If the owner of a life estate acquires the fee to only a part of the remainder, there will be a merger only pro tanto. Accordingly, the life estate in
the remainder of the property is not affected. Clark v. Parsons, 69 N. H. i47
(1897). As a result of this, the purchaser does not become a tenant in common with the other remaindermen, and is not entitled to a contribution from
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them for repairs, if this is the theory of the action.

Of course, if a life tenant

is not entitled to charge the estate for repairs and improvements, the
purchaser of only a part of the interest in remainder, being a life tenant, cannot demand a contribution from the remainderman whose interest he- did
not purchase. Gray's Adm. v. McConnell, 144 Ky. 6D3 (1911).
PROPERTY-WATER COURSES-FLoD WATRs-The flood waters of the
Wabash River spread over wide expanse of land, but move along with the
main current of the stream. A railroad embankment built across this land
impeded the flow of the flood waters. Held: The railroad company is liable
for injuries caused thereby to riparian owners. Evansville, Mt. C. & N. Ry.
Co. v. Scott, ir4 N. E. (Ind.) 649.
In most jurisdictions the flood waters of a stream which form a continuous body with the water flowing in the ordinary channel is regarded as
still a part of the stream, and not as surface water. Crawford v. Rambo, 44
Ohio St. 279 (1886); O'Connell v. East Tenn. Ry. Co., 87 Ga. z46 (i8gi);
Miller v. Canal Co., 155 Cal. 59 (igog). But there is authority for the proposition that it is surface water. Harvey v. N. P. Ry. Co., 63 Wash. 669 (Igi).
In states where the rule that a lower owner cannot reject the surface waters
flowing from land of an upper owner is followed (the civil law rule), there
is no reason for attempting to classify overflow waters as either channel or
In some states
surface. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Reuter, 223 IlL 381 (9o6).
they are considered as in a class distinct from other waters. Thompson v.
Where the general rule is folNew Haven Water Co., 86 Conn. 597 (913).
lowed, it has been held that if flood waters escape and join the waters of
another water course, there is no liability for impeding the flow of these additional waters. Johnson v. Railroad, in Mo. App. 378 (igo5). And even
where the water left the main body for a time, though it joined the same
stream further down, it was held that it became surface water. Singleton v.
Ry. Co., 67 Kans. 284 (i9o3). The principal case accords with the weight of
authority.
PROPERTY-WILLS-CHAACTER OF INSTRUMENT-TESTAMENT OR

DEED-An

instrument executed by three brothers, in actual possession and enjoyment of
a plantation, which provided that on the death of any one of them, his interest
in the property was to vest in the other, subject only to his personal debts,
was held a will and not a deed. Thomas v. Byrd, 73 So. 725 (Ala. 1917).
The intent of the maker is controlling as to whether an instrument is a
deed or a will and the question arises in three classes of cases. First, where
the testamentary intent is clearly deducible; second, where the intent is of
doubtful meaning and ambiguous; third, where it is plainly a deed. Elliott v.
To operate as a will, the maker's intention
Cheyney, 183 Mich. 56i (914).
must not be that the instrument shall operate as a disposition of any present
or future interest before his death; if it passes a present interest, even in a
future estate, at the time of its execution, it will act as a conveyance. Mays
v. Burleson, i8o Ala. 396 (1913); Tennant v. Tennant Memorial Home, 167
And even if the paper is in form a deed, yet if not to
Cal. 570 (914).
become effective until the grantor's death, it is testamentary in character.
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Goodale v. Evans, 263 Mo. =19 (1914). The words used must fairly indicate
grantor's intent to pass a present irrevocable interest in the property, in order
that it may be construed a deed. Phifer v. Mullis, 167 N. C. 4o5 (1914);
Wimpey v. Ledford, 177 S. W. 302 (Mo. 1915). When an instrument may be
construed as either a conveyance or a will according to circumstances, the
court will incline in favor of its testamentary character, without attaching
controlling importance to mere form. Seay et at. v. Huggins, 7o So. 113
(ALa. igs).
On the other hand, a deed may be made which contains a provision that
it shall not take effect until the maker's death, but it is important that it shall
be delivered, otherwise the instrument would assume testamentary character.
Nowakowski v. Sobeziak, 270 Ill. 622 (I915).

But if it is recorded by the

grantor with the intention of delivering it, it will not be held a will, and oral
testimony is not admissible to show that he intended it to be a testamentary
disposition. Jones v. Caird, 153 Wis. 384 (913) ; Burkey v. Burkey, 175 S. W.
623 (Mo. xg95). An option given to a lessee to purchase the demised land
after lessor's death has been held to be contractual and not testamentary.
Smith Co. v. Anderson, 84 N. J. Equity, 681 (1915).
In case of doubt, some courts hold that the instrument is to be construed
whichever way it may be operative, and not the way in which it would be void
and inoperative. Stevens v. Haile, 162 S. W. io25 (Tex. 1914); Trumbauer
v. Rust, 36 S. Dak. 3o (i915).
To CARRIR-RIGnT TO INsPFC-Under a contract of
SALZs-DFLrVyR
sale, coffee, billed to vendee subject to right to inspect, was delivered to a
common carrier. The coffee was lost in transit. In a suit for the price of
sale, held: Delivery to a common carrier raises a presumption of delivery to
vendee which is not rebutted by reservation of right to inspect the goods.
Robbins v. Brazil Syndicate R. & B. Co., 114 N. F. 7o7 (Ind. 1917).
The principal case seems to be in accord with the weight of authority.
The delivery to a carrier is deemed a constructive delivery to the vendee
because under the contract of carriage, such delivery divests the vendor of his
right to possession and vests it in the vendee. Rickey v. Tutelman, i9 Pa.
Super. Ct. 4o3 (9oz). The goods delivered must fulfill the contract requirements as to quality, Baird v. Pratt, 78 C. C. A. 515 (i9o6), and time of
shipment. McKelvey v. Perham, 31 Mont. 6o2 (igo5).
Generally a right to inspect and return if goods do not come up to standard does not change the presumption as to delivery passing title, Kid Co. v.
Leather Co., 89 AUt. 367 (Del. 1914) ; though some cases hold the contrary
rule.

Deutsch v. Dunham, 72 Ark. 141 (1904).

If the goods do not fulfill

the contract requirements no title passes, even on receipt by vendee, Dube v.
Clothing Co., x53 N. Y. S. 577 (i915) ; but if it is a "Sale or Return" contract
re-delivery to carrier by vendee revests title in vendor. Drug Co. v. Zeller
C9., 191 Ill. App. 5o8 (i915).
TonTs-LiABmxyIT

or TowNs--A city is not liable for an injury caused by

the faulty construction of a free public bathhouse.

Bolsler v. City of Law-

rence, 114 N. E. 722 (Mass. 1917).

The general rule is that a city is not liable for injuries caused by defects

RECENT CASES
in property owned by it and used solely for public benefit, as in the case of a
schoolhouse, Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426 (i89i) ; and a public park,
Russell v. Tacoma, 8 Wash. i56 (1894). Similarly, such municipalities are
not liable for the negligence of officers whose duties are purely governmental
or performed solely for public good, as the police, Tomlin v. Hildredth, 65
N. J. L. 438 (igoo) ; firemen, Kies v. Erie, i35 Pa. i44 (i8go) ; health officers,
Beeks v. Dickinson County, 131 Ia. 244 (igo6). However, the city is liable
for the care of its property from which it derives a piofit, as water works,
Boothe v. Fulton, 85 Mo. App. i6 (igoo) ; a rented town hall, Little v. Holyoke, i77 Mass. 114 (igoo); a toll wharf. Milley v. Allegheny, 1i8 Pa. 490
(1888).
In Pennsylvania, however, a municipality is liable even for the care of
that property which is devoted solely to public good, just as any other landowner, Powers v. Phila., i8 Super. Ct. 621 (Pa. i9o2) ; such as a public park,
Barthold v. Phila., I54 Pa. iog (1893); a fire engine house, Kies v. Erie, i69
Pa. 598 (1895); an elevator in a public building. Fox v. Phila., 208 Pa. 127
(1904).
WITNESSEs-ATrORNEY

AND

CLIENT-PRIVILEGE-PROFESSIONAL

EMPLOY-

a suit on a deed, the attorney employed by the parties to draft it
was questioned as to the real nature of the transaction. Held: The communication was not made to him in his professional capacity and is not privileged. Shepard v. Mendenhall, I9i S. W. 237 (Ark. I917).
The common-law rule which prohibits an attorney from testifying to any
communication made to him by a client, without the clienes consent, has been
very generally enacted into statute law. For a summary of the statutes see
Wigmore on Evidence, 3204, note i. The test as to whether the communication is privileged is whether the attorney's employment is so connected with
his professional character as to afford a presumption that this formed the
ground of the confidence reposed. Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195 (1916).
Accordingly, as in the principal case, where an attorney is employed merely
as a scrivener to draft a deed, contract or other legal paper, it is held no
privilege attaches to communications made to him. Mueller v. Batcheler, 131
Iowa 65o (i9o6) ; Childress v. Tate, 148 S. W. 843 (Tex. 1912) ; Chi. Lumber
Co. v. Cox, 94 Kansas 563 (i915). But in a few states and in England, such
employment seems to be regarded as professional and so the privilege attaches.
Carpmall v. Powis, i Phil. Ch. 687 (1846); Brown v. Butler, i7, Conn. 576
(1899). And when the attorney's advice is asked, or the grantee who employs
him tells him to be sure a good title is conveyed, there seems no doubt that
the employment is professional and the communication privileged. Crane v.
Barkdoll, 59 Md. 534 (i882) ; Carter v. West, 93 Ky. 211 (I892). The whole
conversation is protected, not merely that part in which advice is asked.
Mostyn v. West Mostyn Coal Co., 34 Law Times 53r (Eng. 1876); Maas v.
Bloch, 7 Ind. 2o2 (I855).
MENT-In

